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By L. DALE COFFMAN*
S HOULD a state court of first instance, in actions between
residents of the state, be a court of state-wide jurisdiction,
and the place where the action may be tried resolve itself into a
question of venue; or should the power to try such actions be sub-
ject to definite territorial limitations within the state? In actions
between residents of the state where some court of first instance
may certainly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
should the problem of place of trial be one of venue or one of
jurisdiction-of where the action ought to be tried, or of the
power of the court selected to try the action? In answering this
question, is there any real basis for making a distinction between
transitory actions and actions in rem? These questions are directed
only to state courts of general original jurisdiction, and considera-
tions as to the jurisdiction and powers of local inferior tribunals,
such as municipal courts, county courts, police courts, surrogate
courts, and justices of the peace are eliminated.
Nebraska and Ohio have treated this problem as one of juris-
diction, both as to actions in personam and in rem. Because serious
questions might be raised concerning some of the results reached
by virtue of this doctrine, it might be well to see how the problem
has been dealt with in other jurisdictions. Iowa and Minnesota
are Nebraska neighbors, presumably faced with problems similar
to those of Ohio and Nebraska as far as a workable procedure and
practice is concerned; and it would seem that a procedure that
would work satisfactorily in one state should not meet insurmount-
able difficulties in any of the other three. Because New York was
a pioneer among the code states, it seems logical to look briefly
at its manner of dealing with the problem. This problem, there-
fore, will be considered briefly as to each of the five states named.
I. NEBRASKA
The Nebraska Code of Civil Procedure makes specific pro-
vision for the place of trial of certain classes of actions, both
in rem and in personam.1 These actions must be tried in the
*Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
'See Nebraska, Compiled Statutes 1929, sec. 20-401 to sec. 20-403,
relative to actions involving the title to real estate; sec. 20-404, actions
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locality specified, unless the venue is changed because it is "made
to appear to the court that a fair and impartial trial cannot be
had in the county where the suit is pending, or when the judge
is interested or has been of counsel in the case or subject-matter
thereof, or is related to either of the parties, or otherwise dis-
qualified to sit."2 But if the proper county is not selected, if the
action is originally brought in some county other than the place
named in the statute, the court may not direct the action to be
transferred to the proper county. The court does not have juris-
diction; it does not have the power to do anything with the case
other than to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.3
The district court of Nebraska is not a court of state-wide
jurisdiction. Even in regard to purely personal actions between
residents of the state, the jurisdiction of the court is subjected to
the definite territorial limits of the county in which it sits. The
general provision relative to transitory actions is: " Every other
action must be brought in the county in which the defendant, or
some one of the defendants, resides or may be summoned."' The
word "must," as used here, is given a strict interpretation; strict.
in the sense that if the action is brought in violation of the pro-
visions of the statute, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. It
is submitted, in passing, that simply because the statute provides
"must be brought," this alone should not limit the jurisdiction of
the court. "Must" might just as well refer to venue.8
The results of this strict interpretation placed upon the statute
seem to be unfortunate. Let us assume that P, a resident of A
county, has a personal claim against D, a resident of B county.
If P brings suit in the District Court of A county, and causes
personal service to be made on D in B county, the court fails to
acquire jurisdiction. The action has not been brought in the county
for the recovery of a fine or penalty, or actions against public officers
or their bondsmen; see. 20-405, actions against corporations; sec. 20-406,
actions against common carriers; sec. 20-407, actions against turnpike
companies; sec. 20-408, actions against non-residents and foreign insurance
companies. See also Coffman, Counties to Which Summons May Issue
in Nebraska, (1934) 12 Neb. L. Bull. 341.2Nebraska, Compiled Statutes 1929, sec. 20-410; see also sections
20-411 and 20-412 for provisions as to the procedure for change of venue,
and procedure in those actions affecting the title to real estate.
3See Coffman, Counties to Which Summons May Issue in Nebraska,(1934) 12 Neb. L. Bull. 341, and Nebraska cases there collected.
4Nebraska, Compiled Statutes 1929, sec. 20-409.
5See the discussion beginning at part III of the text relative to the
Iowa, Minnesota and New York provisions.
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where the defendant "resides or may be summoned."8 The court
does not acquire jurisdiction with the power to change the venue
to the proper county upon demand; it simply has no power to
deal with the case, and the plaintiff is in the same position as if
he had never started an action. If the statute of limitations has
run on his claim before he can bring a new action, the defendant
may successfully plead it as a bar.
P may bring his action in B county. If D chooses to stay
in B county, that is the only place where the plaintiff may insti-
tute the action. The argument is made that if the plaintiff were
allowed to select his forum in some part of the state remote from
the county of the residence of the defendant, and prosecute the
action there, then such possibility would serve as a potent instru-
ment of abuse. It would put a sword into the hands of the plaintiff
to compel settlement of small contested claims, because the cost
of defense would be greater than the cost of settlement. That
argument, it is submitted, is inappropriate. To accomplish the
result suggested, it is not necessary to conclude that the state court
of original jurisdiction is without the power to change the venue
to the proper county. It is not necessary to place territorial
limitations upon the jurisdiction of the court. The argument is
directed to the proper venue, not to the power of the court.
In fact, the statute itself defeats the very object of the sugges-
tion. The statute provides that the action must be brought in
the county in which the defendant, or some one of the defendants,
resides or may be summoned. Thus, if D, residing in B county,
comes to A county, the residence of P, P may cause D to be
served in A county and the action may be tried in A county,
because the defendant was summoned in A county. Likewise, if
D happens to be in some remote corner of the state, P may bring
the action wherever he may happen to find D and cause service of
summons to be made upon him. Of course, no matter what the
inconvenience to D in being forced to defend where he may happen
to be served, he cannot change the venue to the county of his
residence because of such inconvenience! Therefore, the terms
of the statute and the decisions thereunder, defeat the very argu-
ment made in favor of the limited jurisdiction of the trial tribunal.
The court, recognizing the possibility that the plaintiff might
6See Coffman, Counties to Which Summons May Issue in Nebraska,
(1934) 12 Neb. L. Bull, 341.
7The grounds for change of venue have been set out in the text at
footnote 2.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
select the forum in some remote part of the state and there lie
in wait for the chance coming of the defendant within the juris-
diction, has placed certain limitations upon this power of the
plaintiff. If a petition is filed and summons issued on a date
when personal service within the jurisdiction is impossible because
of the absence of a nonresident of the county, the fact that the
nonresident does later come within the jurisdiction and is per-
sonally served before the return day named in the summons, does
not give the court jurisdiction, and such service is void. The
petition must be filed and summons issued thereon at a time when
personal service is presently possible, not simply prospectively
possible. It is said that the rule prevents the filing of petitions
in several counties, the issuance of summonses with no possibility
of service, followed by service when the nonresident does come
within the jurisdiction, with the result that a defendant will be
compelled to defend at a place distant from his home, where it
might be inconvenient for him and his witnesses.8 But it is sub-
mitted that this limitation is solely upon the means, and not the
result. The result remains that the plaintiff, in a transitory action,
may sue the defendant in any county of the state in which he may
be found, and the defendant may be forced to defend there
regardless of the inconvenience or regardless of the residence of
the parties within the state.
Starting then with the proposition that the action must be
brought in the county of the defendant's residence or where he
may be summoned, and that this is a jurisdictional and not a
venue requirement, some provision must be made for the case in
which there are several defendants residing in, or served in dif-
ferent counties. The statute provides that "when the action is
rightly brought in any county, according to the provisions of this
code a summons shall be issued to any other county, against any
one or more of the defendants at the plaintiff's request." The
unsatisfactory result seems to have been reached, that the case
must first be heard on the merits in order to determine whether the
plaintiff can successfully prosecute his claim against the resident
defendant, before the court can determine whether it has jurisdic-
tion to try the case against the out-of-county defendants. This
8Coffman v. Brandhoeffer, (1891) 33 Neb. 279, 50 N. W. 6; Hoag-
land v. Wilcox, (1894) 42 Neb. 138, 60 N. W. 376; Mosher v. Huwaldt,
(1910) 86 Neb. 686, 125 N. W. 143; Lamb v. Perkins, (1910) 87 Neb.
565, 127 N. W. 903; Davis v. Ballard, (1894) 38 Ncb. 830, 57 N. W. 527.
9Nebraska, Compiled Statutes 1929, sec. 20-504.
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conclusion is reached because the term "rightly brought" has
been interpreted to mean "successfully prosecuted.""0
There is an earlier line of cases, supported by dicta in later
cases, to the effect that if the plaintiff states a cause of action
against the resident defendant and introduces sufficient evidence
to make out a prima facie case against the resident, and by such
evidence shows his good faith in joining the resident as a party
defendant, then the action has been "rightly brought ;" and the
jurisdiction of the court over the nonresident does not depend upon
the success or failure of the plaintiff in prosecuting his claim
against the resident." This, it is submitted, is a more practicable
and reasonable interpretation of the statute. Under a similar
statutory provision Kansas has reached this result. Of course,
the plaintiff should not be permitted to choose the forum by the
simple device of joining a local nominal defendant who has no
interest in the controversy.
"But this rule cannot be applied to a plaintiff who sued in good
faith in an honest belief that he had a cause of action against the
resident as well as the nonresident, and the mere fact that he
fails to recover against the former will not of itself defeat a judg-
ment against the latter. . . . The controlling element in such a
case is the good faith in the joinder."'1
The results of an interpretation of "rightly brought" to mean
"successfully prosecuted," it is submitted, are eminently unsatis-
factory. The plaintiff is required to choose the place of trial at
his peril. It is impossible in all cases to determine, before the
trial, the power of the court to decide the controversy. A trial
on the merits is necessary in order to determine the power of the
court to try the case on the merits. If such results do not neces-
sarily inhere in the organization of state trial tribunals, it is time
means were developed to eliminate them. The parties should be
able to ask for no more than one fair trial on the merits, and a
'oSee Coffman, Counties to Which Summons May Issue in Nebraska,(1934) 12 Neb. L. Bull. 341, and cases there collected.
"Pearson v. Kansas Mfg. Co., (1883) 14 Neb. 211, 15 N. W. 346;
Dunn v. Haines, (1895) 17 Neb. 560, 6 N. W. 397; Bailey v. Chilton,(1921) 106 Neb. 795, 184 N. IV. 939; see Coffman, Counties to Which
Summons May Issue in Nebraska, (1934) 12 Neb. L. Bull. 341 for a
complete collection of the Nebraska authorities. The later Nebraska
authorities dearly interpret "rightly brought" to mean "successfully pro-
secuted:" forearty v. Strunk, (1929) 118 Neb. 718, 226 N. W. 329;
Peters v. Pothast, (1930) 120 Neb. 208, 231 N. W. 805.
12Johnston, C. J., in Van Buren v. Pratt, (1927) 123 Kan. 581,
583, 256 P. 1006; see discussion on this point in Maloney v. Callahan,
(1933) 127 Ohio St. 387, 188 N. E. 656.
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procedure should be devised whereby the place of trial might be
determined before the trial on the merits.'
3
II. OHIO
The common pleas court of Ohio is the court of general
original jurisdiction. The General Code makes specific provision
for the place of trial of certain classes of action, both in rem and
in personam. 14  As in Nebraska, this is a jurisdictional require-
ment, and is not simply a provision for venue or place of trial of
these actions. 15 The general provision for actions in personam is:
"Every other action must be brought in the county in which a
defendant resides or may be sununoned, except actions against an
executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, which may be brought
in the county wherein he was appointed or resides, in which cases
summons may issue to any county."'16
The word "must" as used in the statute, is again interpreted
as limiting the jurisdiction of the court even in purely personal
actions between residents of the state." The common pleas court
of Ohio is therefore not a court of statewide jurisdiction, in
actions in rem, in personal actions in which the place of trial is
specifically designated, or in transitory actions generally. The
illustrations given above as to the effect of this rule in Nebraska
apply with equal force in Ohio.
If, in transitory actions, the jurisdiction of the court is
limited to the "county in which a defendant resides or may be
summoned," some provision must be made for the situation where
there are several necessary or proper parties defendant, residing
in or summoned in different counties. The General Code provides:
" See discussion in Coffman, Counties to Which Summons May Issue
in Nebraska, (1934) 12 Neb. L. Bull. 341.
'
4Ohio, General Code sec. 11268, When to be brought where property
situated; sec. 11269, When may be brought where part of property situated;
sec. 11270, In actions for specific performance; sec. 11271, Where the
cause of action arose; sec. 11272, Other actions against corporations; sec.
11273, Actions against railroad company, inter-urban, suburban or street
railroad, and stage companies, where brought; sec. 11276, Further pro-
visions as to non-residents; sec. 6308, in motor vehicle accident cases, the
venue may be laid in the county where the injured persons reside.
15See 32 Ohio Jurisprudence 407: "The validity of service of process
depends upon the correctness of the venue of the actions as brought,
for no defendant is obliged to appear in answer to a summons issued out
of the wrong county."
16Ohio, General Code sec. 11277.
17 Dunn v. Hazlett, 4 Ohio St. 435 (1854); City of Fostoria v. Fox,
(1899) 60 Ohio St. 340, 54 N. E. 370; 32 Ohio Jurisprudence 407, and
cases there collected.
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"When the action is rightly brought in any county, according to
the provisions of the next chapter, a summons may be issued to
any other county, against one or more of the defendants, at the
plaintiff's request."'1 8 The similarity between this and the Nebras-
ka provision is at once apparent; and upon examination of the
cases, the similarity in the interpretation of the provision becomes
apparent.
To require a nonresident to defend in a county other than the
county of his residence or where he may be served, there must
be a proper joinder of defendants and causes of action; the statute
has no application where there is a misjoinder of causes of action
or parties defendant. 19 This would seem to be a necessary result
if the statute is to mean anything. Even if the court were a court
of state-wide jurisdiction and this statute were a provision for
venue merely, any other interpretation would permit the plaintiff
to lay the venue of any action in any county whatsoever in which
resided a person against whom he had some claim.20
But assuming that the nonresident and resident defendants
are either necessary or proper parties defendant, and that there
has been no misjoinder of causes of action, when can it be said
that the action has been "rightly brought?" There are several
possible interpretations:
(1) A statement of a cause of action against both the resident
and nonresident. It might be said that if the plaintiff states in
his petition a good cause of action against each, and there is no
showing of misjoinder of parties or causes of action, then the
action may be said to have been rightfully brought. The difficulty
with this interpretation is that the statute would be meaningless if
it were adopted. It would permit the joinder of nominal or fic-
titious defendants solely for the purpose of laying the venue
wherever the plaintiff might choose. This, it is submitted, is just
what the statute is designed to prohibit. Nebraska and Ohio are
both clear in their decisions that the plaintiff must do more than
simply state a cause of action against both defendants in his peti-
tion before the action can be said to have been "rightly brought."
A nonresident defendant cannot be compelled to defend in some
county other than the county of his residence, or where he may be
'-Ohio, General Code sec. 11282.
19Smith v. Johnson, (1898) 57 Ohio St. 486, 49 N. E. 693; Bigger
v. Insurance Co., (1909) 8 N. P. (N.S.) 27, 19 D. 704.
20 See discussion in part I of text, as to Nebraska rule.
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summoned, by joining, as a resident defendant, a mere nominal
party or one who has no substantial interest in the controversy. 2L
(2) The action might be said to have been "rightly brought"
if the plaintiff introduces any evidence as to the liability of the
resident defendant:
(A) Even though a verdict is directed in favor of the resident
at the close of the plaintiff's case;
(B) Even though a verdict is directed in favor of the resident
at the close of all of the evidence;
(C) Even though a jury question is made out on all of the
evidence, and the jury returns a verdict in favor of the resident.
(3) The action might be said to have been "rightly brought"
if the plaintiff introduces sufficient evidence in support of his
alleged cause of action against the resident, to show that the
resident is not merely a nominal defendant, and to show good
faith on the part of the plaintiff in joining the resident as a party
defendant. Under this test, the action would have been right-
fully brought regardless of the outcome of the case against the
resident, whether (A), (B), or (C) noted under (2).
(4) The action cannot be said to have been rightfully brought
unless the plaintiff proves his case against the resident: unless the
plaintiff is able to prosecute successfully his claim against the
resident defendant.
Under the second or the third test suggested, the final dis-
position of the case between the plaintiff and the resident would
make no difference; nor would it matter in what manner that
disposition was made.2 2  It is submitted that the second test would
21See Coffman, Counties to Which Summons May Issue in Nebraska,
(1934) 12 Neb. L. Bull. 341, for the Nebraska cases on this point; prob-
ably the leading case in Ohio, and the case cited many times in Nebraska
as well as Ohio, is Allen v. Miller, (1860) 11 Ohio St. 374; the following
language has been quoted many times in both jurisdictions (at p. 378) : "It
seems to us, that the words 'defendant' and 'defendants,' as employed in those
sections of the code to which reference has been made, in so far as they
affect the question of jurisdiction, must be held to mean not nominal
defendants merely, but parties who have a real and substantial interest
adverse to the plaintiff and against whom substantial relief is sought; and
that to hold otherwise, would open wide a door to all sorts of colorable
devices, to defeat the policy of the law in respect to jurisdiction,-devices
difficult to detect, but oppressive and wrongful in their practical application."
See also Thompson v. Massie, (1884) 41 Ohio St. 307; Gorey v. Black,
(1919) 100 Ohio St. 73, 125 N. E. 126; Drea v. Carrington, (1877) 32 Ohio
St. 595.
22To say that the action is or is not rightly brought depending upon
either (A), (B) or (C) would be arbitrary and unreasonable. Either
the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence for some purpose, or he
has not. If there is no purpose, suggestion (2) would be applicable.
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be impracticable. Unquestionably the resident defendant must
be more than a mere nominal defendant joined solely for the pur-
pose of compelling the nonresident to defend in a county other
than that of his residence or where he may be summoned. Could
the plaintiff introduce "any evidence" against such a defendant?
He probably could. Then what is the purpose of the requirement
that the plaintiff introduce some evidence in support of the alleged
liability of the resident? It would seem that the plaintiff might
reasonably be required to show that the resident is not a mere nom-
inal defendant; the purpose would seem to be to show that the
plaintiff did have reasonable cause to join the resident as a party
defendant; that the plaintiff did have probable cause in believing
that he could support his claim against the resident, and to show
good faith in so joining the resident. One line of authority in
Nebraska seems to adopt this test.2 And this seems to be the
test adopted in Kansas.24 Of course, when we speak of "good
faith," "bona-fides," "probable cause," or "reasonable grounds,"
we are speaking of a standard; and standards are always more
difficult of application than rules. Reasonable minds may differ
as to whether the facts come within the standard. A definite rule
may be capable of almost automatic application, and all may readily
ascertain whether the facts come within the statement of the rule.
If we say that the plaintiff must recover from the local de-
fendant before the action can be said to have been rightfully
brought as to the nonresidents, it is not difficult to determine
whether the conditions of the rule have been met; either the plain-
tiff does or does not recover from the local defendant. That con-
sideration might have had some weight in determining the con-
struction to be placed upon this statute, but the fact remains that
Ohio has definitely adopted the fourth suggestion mentioned
above. It was held at an early date that
"where a resident and a nonresident of the county are sued as joint
contractors, and service is made on the latter in his own county,
and on the trial it turns out that the resident defendant is not
liable, judgment can not be rendered against the nonresident, be-
cause the jurisdiction of the court over his person depended on his
being rightly joined with the resident defendant, and as the ver-
dict found he was not liable, there was no authority to summon
The writer suggests a purpose in suggestion (3) which, it is submitted,
is a reasonable test.23See footnote 11.24Van Buren v. Pratt, (1927) 123 Kan. 581, 256 P. 1006.
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the nonresident to answer out of the county where he was
served.
25
Thus, "rightly brought" means "successfully prosecuted."
There must be a trial on the merits in order to determine whether
the court has the power to try the case on the merits. If a ver-
dict is returned in favor of the resident, and against the nonresi-
dent, the nonresident, although he has had a fair trial on the
merits, is not bound by the verdict or judgment rendered thereon,
because the court has no power to enter judgment against him.
The plaintiff must begin over, and if the statute of limitations
has run on his claim in the meantime, his claim is barred. But
suppose that the jury returns a general verdict in favor of all the
defendants. May the plaintiff then bring another action against
the nonresident in the county of his residence? The court has
followed this doctrine to its logical conclusion, and has said:
"The court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the
plaintiff having invoked it against the defendant, cannot object
to an affirmance of the judgment on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. It is an
advantage a defendant in such a case has: He may avail him-
self of a judgment in his favor on the merits, or set it aside for
want of jurisdiction, where it is against him." 26
25Drea v. Carrington, (1877) 32 Ohio St. 595, at p. 603. In Gorey
v. Black, (1919) 100 Ohio St. 73, 125 N. E. 126, the action was properly
brought in Licking County against Clark, but Black, a non-resident, was
joined as a party defendant, the plaintiff alleging that the two werejoint tort-feasors. It was said, at p. 80: "And if in the case in Licking
County he can on the other hand demonstrate that the defendant Clark
had no part in the committing of the wrong, that would oust the
jurisdiction against him even if the proof showed that he had wrongfully
injured the plaintiff, because the essential basis of the right to proceed
against Black in .Licking County is that a joint tort-feasor has beenjoined in that case and properly served there. A plaintiff cannot compel
persons residing out of the county where suit is brought to defend there
by simply joining them with another person or persons against whom
there is no joint right of action." In Adams v. Trepanier Lumber Co.,
(1927) 117 Ohio St. 298, 158 N. E. 541, 55 A. L. R. 1118, it is said,
at p. 302: "It has been held in this state that, where no judgment is
rendered against the only party defendant who resides in the county
where suit is brought, the court has no jurisdiction to render a judgment
against the defendant who resides in another county, service upon whom
was secured by reason of the service upon the defendant resident in the
county where the action was brought." See also Allen v. Miller, (1860)
11 Ohio St. 374; City of Fostoria v. Fox, (1899) 60 Ohio St. 340, 54
N. E. 370. In Bucurenciu v. Ramba, (1927) 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N. E.
565, it is brought out clearly that this jurisdictional question is one to
be determined by a trial on the merits, and cannot be decided until the
verdict of the jury is returned.
26City of Fostoria v. Fox, (1899) 60 Ohio St. 340, 54 N. E. 370,
at p. 352. One way to avoid this result may be to serve, if possible,
the non-resident in the county in which the action is brought, as well
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This result is absurd. The nonresident may demand a trial on the
merits in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court over
him. If the verdict of the jury is in favor of all defendants-
resident and nonresident-the nonresident may successfully plead
res adjudicata if the plaintiff brings another action against him.
If the verdict is in favor of the resident, but in favor of the
plaintiff as against the nonresident, he may successfully assert
the lack of jurisdiction of the court. It is said, however, that
this result is the fault of the plaintiff; he may require the jury to
determine the jurisdictional question first, and if that is deter-
mined in favor of the nonresident, then there is no verdict on the
merits in favor of the nonresident.2 7
But this takes care of only a portion of the difficulty. True,
as in the county of his residence, as was done in Paragon Refining Co.
v. Higbea, (1925) 22 Ohio App. 440, 153 N. E. 860, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 703.
There summons was issued and served upon the Rank Market Company
in Williams County, Ohio, and at the same time summons was issued
to Lucas County for the Paragon Refining Company, and served upon
that company in Lucas County. Thereafter, and without quashing the
service upon the Paragon Refining Company in Lucas County, a summons
was issued for that company to the sheriff of Williams County, and
service made in that county. The court said (at p. 444): "The claim
is made that, as the verdicts were in favor of the defendant the Rank
Market Company, the service upon the Paragon Refining Company
in a foreign county was invalid, and that service on the same defendant
in Williams County was invalid also, for the reason that an alias summons
cannot be issued during the life of the original summons. Therefore it
is claimed that there was no valid service whatsoever. We think the
correct rule in Ohio is, that, where the service of an original summons
is not valid, the party seeking service is not required to wait until the
first service is quashed before issuing an alias summons . . . There
was a valid service of summons upon the defendant the Paragon Refining
Company, for, if the service in Lucas County was invalid, the service
in Williams County was valid." Thus, even though the service of the
second summons would be invalid if the first summons were valid, and
the validity of the first summons could not be determined until after
the service of the second summons, and after a trial on the merits, the
court concluded that one of these summonses must be valid.27Speaking through Robinson, J. in Bucurenciu v. Ramba, (1927)
117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N. E. 565, at pp. 552-553, the court has recognized
this objection, and this means of partially relieving the difficulty, when
it is said: "In all cases of this character, either counsel or the court,
and usually both, bring forward the argument that it is unjust, a waste
of the time of the court and of the substance and energy of the litigants,
and generally impracticable, to permit a defendant to participate through-
out a trial, and, upon a verdict being rendered against him, to then avail
himself of the want of jurisdiction of the court over his person, and, in
the event of the verdict being in his favor, to insist upon judgment,
and thus be in a position to plead res adjudicata to an action brought
in a district where jurisdiction over his person could properly be obtained.
To all such argument the answer may well be made that if such a situation
results it is the fault either of counsel or the court; that it is within the
power of counsel to require the court, where the question of jurisdiction
over the person is one of fact, to direct the jury to determine that issue
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if the plaintiff's attorney asks that the jury determine the juris-
dictional question first, then the judgment goes only to that prob-
lem, and the nonresident may not plead res adjudicata when
another action is brought. But if the judgment is in favor of the
nonresident, the plaintiff must start all over again, and even
though he has once proved his case against the nonresident, and
the nonresident has had one fair trial on the merits, he may de-
mand another. And we are still met with the problem of the
statute of limitations. All the objections to the result in Nebraska
are equally applicable to the Ohio decisions.
28
Since the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the result
of the trial on the merits, the nonresident may attack the juris-
diction by filing a general denial.2 9 If it appeared upon the face of
first and to further direct it that, if it find that the resident defendant
was not a joint tort-feasor with the non-resident defendant, it find the issue
of jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant in favor
of such non-resident defendant, and that it so state in its verdict, and
that as to him it will consider the case no further. The judgment upon
such verdict will then go to that subject alone. If, then, it is within
the power of counsel and the court to prevent an unfair advantage inuring
to the non-resident defendant by reason of his having at the same time
denied the jurisdiction and participated in the trial, the force of tie
argument necessarily fails."
28See also Maloney v. Callahan, (1933) 127 Ohio St. 387, 188 N. E.
656. There, the action against the resident was dismissed, and the case
allowed to proceed against the non-resident. The basis of the decision
seems to be that the dismissal, alone, is no determination of the non-
liability of the resident; he might have settled out of court. It is said,
pp. 392-393: "True, the trial court dismissed the actions against Isaacs
at his costs, constituting a valid judgment for cost against him, but the
reason for the dismissal is not disclosed, and we are left to conjecture. It
may be that Isaacs made settlement, and was dismissed on that account.
If it were apparent from the records that there was no joint liability
on the part of Isaacs, the resident defendant, and his dismissal was for
that reason, we would be required to hold that the trial court was with-
out jurisdiction to render valid judgments against Maloney, the non-
resident defendant . . . However, the bare fact that Isaacs was dismissed
from the action does not of itself justify us in saying that the trial court
thereby lost jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant; the records
failing to show that Isaacs could not have been legally included in the
judgments. In other words, the fact of his dismissal standing alone does
not establish his non-liability." This is contrary to the holding of the
Nebraska court on this question: see Cobbey v. Wright, (1890) 23 Neb.
250, 36 N. W. 505; 29 Neb. 274, 45 N. W. 460. It is interesting to note
that the Ohio court quotes from Ramirez v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.,
(1928) 116 Neb. 740, 219 N. W. 1, which is a case dealing with the time
of commencement of the action, and the language relative to the meaning
of "rightly brought" is dictum and incorrect in Nebraska.
29Dunn v. Hazlett, (1854) 4 Ohio St. 435; Coverson v. Carpenta, (1928)
29 Ohio App. 482, 163 N. E. 718; Drea v. Carrington, (1877) 32 Ohio St.
595; Long v. Newhouse, (1897) 57 Ohio St. 348; Dzema v. P. & L. E.
Rd. Co., (1928) 31 Ohio App. 288, 165 N. E. 376, 28 Ohio L. Rep. 33,
7 Ohio L. Abs. 397.
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the petition that the plaintiff had no right to send summons to
another county, a motion to quash such summons might be en-
tertained and determined by the court, because that would be a
question of law. 0 But if the lack of jurisdiction does not appear
upon the face of the record, the nonresident, by denying the juris-
diction in his answer to the merits, is raising the jurisdictional
question at this first opportunity.
"It seems clear that if upon the face of the petition a case is
made in which all the defendants are rightfully joined, and serv-
ice is made on one or more in the county where the suit is brought,
and on the others in another county, the question of jurisdiction
of the court over the persons of the defendants served in such
other county must be raised by answer, and becomes one of the
issues in the case. The trial court is without authority to pass
upon the question of jurisdiction until such answer is filed and
the evidence introduced upon all pertinent issues, including the
question of jurisdiction." 31
The nonresident cannot successfully raise the jurisdictional ques-
tion in the answer, if, before answering, he does anything that
amounts to a general appearance.3 2  Of course, the objection to
the jurisdiction may be specifically urged in the answer; but a
general denial filed by the nonresident also accomplishes this pur-
pose. This rule arose first in a situation where the resident and
nonresident were sued as joint obligors; either both were liable
for the full amount, or neither was liable at all. It was there
determined that a general denial filed by the nonresident success-
fully raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the court. 3  This
same rule has been applied where the defendants are only proper
parties defendant, and not necessary parties defendant.3' How-
ever, in a situation where the resident and the nonresident are not
necessary parties defendant, but are simply proper parties de-
fendant (such as alleged joint-tort-feasors) it is difficult to see why
3
-Drea v. Carrington, (1877) 32 Ohio St. 595.3 LCoverson v. Carpenta, (1928) 29 Ohio App. 482, 163 N. F- 718,
at p. 485.
32Long v. Newhouse, (1897) 57 Ohio St. 348. The court recognizes
that the defendant may set up this defense in his answer, but if he
moves to strike or to separately state and number, or makes any other such
motion first, he has entered a general appearance; he has not raised the
jurisdictional question at his first opportunity.
a3 Dunn v. Hazlett, (1854) 4 Ohio St. 435.34Drea v. Carrington, (1877) 32 Ohio St. 595; Coverson v. Carpenta,
(1928) 29 Ohio App. 482, 163 N. E. 718; Dzema v. Pittsburgh & L. E.
R. R., (1928) 31 Ohio App. 288, 165 N. E. 376, 28 Ohio L. Rep. 33,
7 Ohio L. Abs. 397; Bucurenciu v. Ramba, (1927) 117 Ohio St. 546, 159
N. E. 565.
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a general denial filed by the nonresident puts the jurisdiction of
the court in issue."5
III. IOWA
In Iowa, the general statutory requirement for the venue of
personal actions is as follows:
"Personal actions, except as otherwise provided, must be
brought in a county in which some of the defendants actually
reside, but if neither of them have a residence in the state, they
may be sued in ahy county in which either of them may be
found."386
An action on a written contract which specifies a particular place
of performance, may be brought in the county where the contract
was to be performed, regardless of the defendant's residence; this
rule, however, is permissive and not mandatory. But even in
35 This distinction is brought out by Justice Vickery's concurring
opinion in Dzema v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. R., (1928) 31 Ohio App. 288.
at pp. 299-300, 165 N. E. 376, 28 Ohio L. Rep. 33, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 397,
but under the authority of Bucurenciu v. Ramba, (1927) 177 Ohio St.
546, 159 N. E. 565, he concludes that the court is left no choice: "Now
it must be remembered that a suit on a joint contract, like that in 4 Ohio
State, (Dunn v. Hazlett, (1854) 4 Ohio St. 435) and a suit against joint
tort-feasors are not parallel. A suit may be brought against joint tort-
feasors and a recovery had against each or any of them, but that is not
so in a joint contract; the judgment must be against all or none. Now
the court, it seems to me, begs the question when it says, that the general
denial is a plea to the jurisdiction. The authorities all seem to hold that
the question of jurisdiction may be raised either by a motion or by an
answer, and, where it cannot be raised by a motion, and it is conceded by
both parties it could not be in the instant case, it seems to the writer
of this opinion that an answer should have been filed setting up the
fact that this was not a joint liability, that they were not joint tort-
feasors, and that the defendant in question was a non-resident of Cuyahoga
County, and that there had been no service made upon it in Cuyahoga
County, and request made that it go hence for the want of jurisdiction."58 Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11049.
11Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11040: "When, by its terms, a written con-
tract is to be performed in any particular place, action for a breach
thereof may, except as otherwise provided, be brought in the county where-
in such place is situated;" The Troy Portable Grain Mill Co. v. Bowen
& Co., (1859) 7 Iowa 464; Oliver v. Bass, (1870) 30 Iowa 90; Haugen
& Co. v. McCarthey, (1872) 34 Iowa 415. The indorser in blank of a
promissory note, when sued alone on his indorsement in the county in
which the note requires the maker to make payment, is entitled to a change
of venue to the county of his residence when said first county is not
the county of his residence in the state, because the legal obligation placed
upon an unqualified indorser does not embrace an obligation to pay in
the county in which the note requires the maker to pay. Dougherty v.
Shankland, (1933) 217 Iowa 911, 251 N. W. 73. A mere implication
arising from a writing that payments maturing under the writing will
be made at a certain place in a certain county, furnishes no legal basis
for bringing action in said county when defendant is an actual resident
of some other county. Basis for such action in a county other than that
of defendant's residence must be found in the express terms of the writing.
Bechtel v. District Court, (1932) 215 Iowa 295, 245 N. W. 299.
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such cases, a change of venue to the county of the defendant's
residence may be alowed if fraud in the inception of the contract
is alleged." If, after the commencement of an action in the county
of the defendant's residence, he removes therefrom, the service of
notice upon him in another county has the same effect as if it had
been made in the county from which he removed."9
In transitory actions, the district courts of Iowa are courts
of state-wide jurisdiction sitting in and for the respective counties.
Even though the statute"0 provides that such actions "must be
brought in a county in which some of the defendants actually
reside," if the action is brought in a county in which none of the
defendants reside, that fact alone does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction.,"
"If an action is brought in a wrong county, it may there be
prosecuted to a termination, unless the defendant, before answer,
demands a change of place of trial to the proper county, in which
case the court shall order the same at the cost of the plaintiff,
and may award the-defendant a reasonable compensation for his
trouble and expense in attending at the wrong county."' 2
Thus, where there is a single defendant who has been properly
served with summons in a transitory action, the question of the
proper place of trial is a problem of venue, and not one of juris-
diction. Even though the wrong county is designated, and re-
gardless of where in the state the defendant has been served, if
the defendant does not move for a change of venue, the court
does acquire jurisdiction and may proceed to judgment.'" The
motion must be made before answer," and one who makes no
objection to a failure to rule on a motion for a change of venue
and goes to trial on the merits, is treated as having abandoned the
3SIowa, Code 1931, sec. 11411: "In an action brought on a written
contract in the county where the contract by its express terms is to be
performed, in which a defendant to said action, residing in a different
county in the state, has filed a sworn answer alleging fraud in the inception
of the contract constituting a complete defense thereto, such defendant.
upon application and the filing of a sufficient bond, may have such action
transferred to the district court of the county of his residence."
39Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11052.
'
0Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11049.
" Lyon v. Cloud, (1858) 7 Iowa 1; Knott v. Dubuque & S. C. Ry.,
(1892) 84 Iowa 462, 51 N. W. 57.
42Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11053. This is a compensatory, and not a penal
statute. Everett v. Board of Supervisors, (1895) 93 Iowa 721, 61 N. W.
1062.
',3Lyon v. Cloud, (1858) 7 Iowa 1; Knott v. Dubuque & S. C. Ry..
(1892) 84 Iowa 462, 51 N. W. 57; Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11053.
"Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11053.
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motion.45 It is submitted that this is a salutary, sensible and
workable rule of procedure, which obviates many of the difficul-
ties discussed with reference to the Ohio and Nebraska procedure.
County lines within the state are at most political lines, deemed
convenient for the efficient working of certain parts of the state
governmental machinery. 46 It would seem that in a purely per-
sonal action between residents of the state, where the defendant
has been properly served with process, the place of trial should
be a matter to be settled before the trial on the merits, and should
not be a question of the jurisdiction of the court.
But Iowa goes only a part of the way in making the district
court a court of state-wide jurisdiction. In the first place, statutes
determining the place of trial of actions in rem are provisions
defining the jurisdiction of the court. Such statutes, it is said,
confer upon the court the jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the action, and if suit is brought in the wrong county, the court of
that county does not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter. The
statute quoted above, 47 providing for the change of venue when
the action is brought in the "wrong county," has no application
where the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter
of the action; the court does not have the power to change the
venue; all it can do is to dismiss the action."8
Iowa starts from the fundamental position that the district
court is a court of state-wide jurisdiction in transitory actions;
Nebraska and Ohio start from the fundamental position that the
trial court of first instance is a court of limited territorial juris-
45Knott v. Dubuque & S. C. Ry., (1892) 84 Iowa 462, 51 N. W. 57.
"6And today, there is much talk of consolidation of many county
functions, whose reason for existence seems to be primarily historical
rather than in the interests of efficiency.47Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11053.
46Post v. Brownell & Co., (1873) 36 Iowa 497; Beck, J., speaking
for the court in Orcutt v. Hanson, (1887) 71 Iowa 514, 32 N. W. 482,
said at p. 518: "To authorize a court to act in an action in rem it must
have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, and, in an action in
personam, it must have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. In
personal actions, the section just quoted, [Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11053]
and those preceding it, give to the court of the 'wrong county' jurisdiction
of the person of the defendants who were served with notice; but, in
actions in rem, the court of the 'wrong county' acquires no jurisdiction of
the subject matter, under the statutes and the decisions of this court.
Now, what order may a court make in an action in rem wherein it has
no jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof? None whatever, except
to dismiss it, or strike it from the docket. As the court lacks jurisdiction
of the subject matter, it can make no order whatever affecting the right
to the rem. These views are based upon the most familiar elementary
principles, which demand no authorities in their support in order to assure
the assent of the legal mind."
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diction. Where there is but a single defendant, the Iowa rule
turns what are jurisdictional problems in Nebraska and Ohio into
problems of venue. But when there are several defendants, resid-
ing in different counties, Iowa has adopted a compromise position.
Where two defendants are sued jointly, the action may be brought
in the county of the residence of either.49  WVhere one of the
parties sued is made a defendant by a cross-petition of his co-
defendant in the original action, he must submit to trial in the
original county, and has no right to a change of venue to the
county of his residence.50 These provisions may not be employed
by a plaintiff to permit the bringing of a suit in a county other
than the county of residence of the "real" defendant; the plaintiff,
by the device of joining a purely nominal party as a resident de-
fendant, cannot force the nonresident to defend in a county other
than the county of his residence.5 1
Thus in Iowa, the court is faced with the same problem con-
sidered with reference to Ohio and Nebraska. When is the
resident defendant one who has "an actual, real and positive in-
terest in the cause," 52 and when is he a nominal or fictitious party,
joined as a defendant for the purpose of forcing the nonresident
to defend in some county other than that of his residence? The
various possible interpretations of "rightly brought" discussed
with reference to the Ohio and Nebraska statutes might well be
considered here. It would seem that as the district court is a
court of state-wide jurisdiction, this is a problem that might well
be settled before a trial on the merits. If, after a trial on the
merits, it turns out that the plaintiff really did not have any claim
against the resident, nevertheless, the nonresident has had one
fair trial on the merits, and that, it would seem, should be all that
he is entitled to. But where the action is against several defend-
ants, some resident and some nonresident of the county, in which
the action is brought,
49Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11049, Staut v. Noteman, (1870) 30 Iowa
414. 50 iahaska City State Bank v. Crist, (1893) 87 Iowa 415, 54 N.
W. 450.51It is said in The Troy Portable Grain Mill Co. v. Bowen & Co..(1859) 7 Iowa 464, at p. 467: "When defendants are mentioned, those
are meant who had an actual, real and positive interest in the cause, and
not those who consent to be made use of to defraud the real parties, and
compel them to attend at the wrong county, at great expense and trouble.
To permit this, would leave the law, in many instances, inoperative and
meaningless."52The Troy Portable Grain Mill Co. v. Bowen & Co., (1859) 7 Iowa
464.
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"and the action is dismissed as to the residents, or judgment is
rendered in their favor, or there is a failure to obtain judgment
against such residents, such nonresidents may, upon motion, have
said cause dismissed, with reasonable compensation for trouble
and expense in attending at the wrong county, unless they, having




This is a compromise position, because it does not automatically
defeat the jurisdiction of the court where the defendant has raised
the jurisdictional question in his answer, and the plaintiff fails to
recover judgment against the resident; but it does give the non-
resident the power to force another trial on the merits."0 The
nonresident is entitled to a dismissal only when the action against
the resident has been dismissed, or judgment entered in favor
of the resident; a verdict of the jury in favor of the resident is
not a dismissal or judgment in his favor, and a motion made after
verdict but before judgment or dismissal is premature. The verdict
does not "terminate the jurisdiction of the court over the parties
or the subject matter. It might be set aside and a new trial
ordered or in some cases judgment entered notwithstanding the
verdict."" The nonresident may obtain a dismissal only upon
motion; averment in the answer that the action has been brought
in the wrong county is not sufficient.58 Thus, the court, in the
absence of motion by the nonresident defendant, has jurisdiction
and may render a valid judgment against the nonresident even
though the local defendant is a purely nominal defendant. But
the nonresident, having had one fair trial upon the merits, if the
result is against him, may demand another trial; if the result is
in his favor, of course he will not move to dismiss. In transitory
actions where there are resident and nonresident defendants, Iowa
has apparently reached a compromise position between its original
proposition that the district court is a court of state-wide jurisdic-
tion, and the territorially limited jurisdiction theory of Ohio and
53Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11051.
54McAlister v. Safley, (1885) 65 Iowa 719, 23 N. W. 139; Woodling
v. Mitchell, (1905) 127 Iowa 262, 103 N. W. 115; Korf v. Howerton,
(1920) 188 Iowa 120, 174 N. W. 350. Where an action is against several
defendants, some of whom are non-residents of the county, and the action
is dismissed as to the resident defendants, such non-residents may have
the cause dismissed as to them; but before they are entitled to a dis-
missal, they must establish the fact of non-residence. Constantine v. Grupe
Co., (1910) 147 Iowa 142, 124 N. W. 189; Porter v. Dalhoff, (1882) 59
Iowa 459, 13 N. W. 420; Bruce v. State S. & S. Co., (1920) 190 Iowa
343, 177 N. W. 457; Hoyt v. Eckles, (1923) 196 Iowa 385, 193 N. W. 578.
55Lyon v. Barnes, (1907) 133 Iowa 717, 720, 111 N. W. 9.
56Brown v. Legion of Honor, (1899) 107 Iowa 439, 78 N. W. 73.
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Nebraska. And the compromise is given in the form of an option
to the nonresident defendant.
In Ohio and Nebraska one of the difficulties discussed dealt
with the application of the statute of limitations. If, after a trial
on the merits, the plaintiff fails to recover against the local de-
fendant, and if the nonresidents have raised the objections to the
jurisdiction properly, even though the nonresident has had a fair
trial on the merits, the whole proceedings go for naught because
the court did not have jurisdiction. If the statute of limitations
has run on the plaintiff's claim in the meantime, his right to
commence a new action against the nonresidents is an empty
privilege. But in Iowa, even though the nonresident may obtain
a dismissal of the cause, and force the plaintiff to bring a new
action in the proper county, the plaintiff cannot be met with the
bar of the statute:
"If, after the commencement of an action, the plaintiff, for
any cause except negligence in its prosecution, fails therein, and
a new one is brought within six months thereafter, the second
shall, for the purpose herein contemplated, be held a continuation
of the first." 7
A distinction is made between the county of residence and
the county of suability. A railroad company may be sued in any
county through which its tracks run.SB It is said that the general
rule as to nonresidents" does not apply as conveniently to this
situation. A railroad company can defend more conveniently in
a county through which it operates its road than in some remote
corner of the state where one of its officers may be served. But
because it may be sued in such a county, it does not follow that
the corporation is a resident of that county; it may be a resident
of another state and suable in Iowa in any county through which
its tracks run. When the company is joined as a defendant with
a person who is a resident of the state, and the action is brought
in the county in which the corporation has tracks, but not in the
county of the residence of the other defendant, the defendant
57Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11017.
5rIowa, Code 1931, sec. 11041: "An action may be brought against any
railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or
cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and tele-
phone companies, or the owner of any line for the transmission of
electric current for lighting, power or heating purposes, and the lessees.
companies, or persons operating the same, in any county through which
guch road or line passes or is operated."
59Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11049, providing for suit in any county where
they may be found.
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resident in the state may secure a change of venue to the county of
his residence. The action must be brought in a "county in which
some of the defendants actually reside,"6 0 and as a railroad com-
pany does not reside in every county in which it may have tracks,
the action must be brought in the county of the residence of one
of the defendants. If the railroad company were the sole de-
fendant, the county of suability would determine the venue.6 '
IV. NEW YORK
The New York supreme court is a court of statewide juris-
diction. "As the jurisdiction of the supreme court is co-extensive
with the boundaries of the state, personal service of a supreme
court summons may be made anywhere within the state." 2  The
Civil Practice Act makes relatively simple provisions for the place
of trial. Generally speaking, actions affecting the title to real
estate must be tried in the county where the real estate, or some
part thereof is situated.6 3  Actions to recover a penalty or forfei-
6
°Iowa, Code 1931, sec. 11049.
61Hinchcliff v. District Court, (1927) 204 Iowa 470, 472, 215 N. W.
605: "The place of suability and actual residence must be differentiated in
construing venue statutes." This case is noted in (1928) 13 Iowa L.
Rev. 212, and the Iowa cases are there collected.
622 Carmody, New York Practice 1122.
6
.Civil Practice Act, sec. 183: "Each of the following actions in the
supreme court must be tried in the county in which the subject of the
action or some part thereof is situated:
1. An action of ejectment;
2. .For the partition of real property;
3. For dower;
4. To foreclose a mortgage upon real property, or upon a chattel real;
5. To compel the determination of a claim to real property.
6. For waste;
7. For a nuisance;
8. To procure a judgment directing a conveyance of real property;
9. Every other action to recover or to procure a judgment establish-
ing, determining, defining, forfeiting, annulling or otherwise affecting an
estate, right, title, lien or other interest in real property or a chattel real."
"
4Civil Practice Act, sec. 184: "An action in the supreme court for
any of the following causes must be tried in the county where the cause
of action or some part thereof arose:
1. To recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed by the statute, except
that where the offence for which it was imposed was committed on a
lake, river or other stream of water situated in two or more counties, the
action may be tried in any county bordering on the lake, river, or stream
and opposite the place where the offence was committed; but in an action
where the people of the state are a party to recover a penalty for trespass
upon the lands of the forest preserve, the action may be tried in a county
adjoining the county where the cause of action arose;
2. Against a public officer or a person specially appointed to execute
his duties for an act done by virtue of his office or for an omission to
perform a duty incident to his office; or against a person who, by the
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ture imposed by statute, or against a public officer for his public
acts or omissions, or to recover a chattel distrained, or damages
therefor, must be tried in the county where the cause of action
or some part thereof arose."' All other actions must be tried in
the county in which one of the parties resided at the commencement
thereof. 5
If the action is not brought in the proper county, the court
having state-wide jurisdiction, may proceed with the trial and
render a valid judgment.
"In an action in the supreme court, notwithstanding that the
county designated in the complaint as the place of trial is not the
proper county, the action may be tried therein unless the place of
trial is changed to the proper county upon the demand of the
defendant, followed by the consent of the plaintiff or the order of
the court."8 16
The provision for the place of trial of in rein actions is not
intended to define the jurisdiction of the court, but simply to de-
termine the place of trial of actions of which it has jurisdiction. t
Personal actions generally "must be tried in the county in
which one of the parties resided at the commencement of the
action."8 81 The word "resided" as used in the statute, refers to
residence and not domicile.
"Residence implies an established, as distinguished from a
temporary abode, however, one fixed permanently for a time, for
business or other purposes, although there may be an intent in the
future at some time or other to return to the original domicile.
command or in the aid of a public officer, has done anything touching
his duties;
3. To recover a chatteP distrained, or damages for distraining a
chattel."
eSCivil Practice Act, sec. 182: "An action in the supreme court not
specified in the two following sections must be tried in the county in
which one of the parties resided at the commencement thereof. An
executor or administrator shall be deemed a resident of the county of his
appointment, as well as the county in which he actually resides. If
neither of the parties then resided in the state it may be tried in any
county which the plaintiff designates for that purpose in the title of the
complaint. A party having or maintaining a residence in more than
one county shall be deemed a resident of either county."6SCivil Practice Act, sec. 186.
878 Carmody, New York Practice 724: "If the action is brought in
the supreme court, the proper venue is the county in which the real
property, or some part thereof, is situated. Notwithstanding that the
county designated is not the proper county, the action may nevertheless
proceed in such county unless removed to the proper county." In Cragin v.
Lovell, (1882) 88 N. Y. 258, at p. 263, it is said: "That section (re-
ferring to what is now sec. 183, quoted above) was not intended to define
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but simply to determine the place
of trial of actions of which it had jurisdiction."6sCivil Practice Act, sec. 182.
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Casual or temporary sojourning of a person in a county, whether
for business or for pleasure, does not make him a resident of said
county; still, on the other hand, it is not essential that a person
should come into the county with the intention to remain there
permanently, to constitute him a resident." '9
If a party has several residences in different counties, the venue
may be laid properly in any of such counties; this is true with
respect to parties plaintiff or defendant. 70  In contrast with the
distinction between suability and residence brought out by the
Iowa decisions, in New York a railroad company is deemed to
have a residence in each county through which it operates its
road.71
Section 187 of the New York Civil Practice Act sets forth
the grounds for a change of place of trial:
"The court, by order, may change the place of trial of an
action in the supreme court in either of the following cases:
1. Where the county designated for that purpose in the com-
plaint is not the proper county;
2. Where there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot
be had in the proper county; or
3. Where the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of
justice will be promoted by the change."
The privilege of changing the place of trial may be waived, 1
and if so waived the court may not refuse to try the action, or
894 Carmody, New York Practice 2616, and cases there collected.
A domestic corporation having its principal office and place of business
in a county, is a "resident" of the county within the statutes defining
the place of trial. Finch School v. Finch, (1911) 144 App. Div. 687, 129
N. Y. S. 1.7OIn Shepard v. Squire, (1894) 76 Hun 598, 28 N. Y. S. 218, it is
said, at p. 219: "Nor are the words 'one of the parties,' in section 984,
[Civil Practice Act, sec. 182] entitled to such construction as to necessarily
embrace all the plaintiffs or all the defendants, when they, respectively,
consist of more than one person. In that case each one of the persons is
a party plaintiff or defendant, and the import of the language used is,
in view of its purpose, the same as if it read that 'an action must be
tried in the county in which one of the persons who is a party resided.' "
In Bischoff v. Bischoff, (1903) 88 App. Div. 126, 85 N. Y. S. 81, it is
said, at p. 81: "A person may have one or more residences, as distinguished
from a domicile; and if the plaintiff at the time of commencement of this
action had either an actual residence or a domicile in Westchester county,
the action is properly brought in that county, although the plaintiff may
also have had a residence elsewhere." Carmody suggests that the present
statutory provision was designed to incorporate the rule of the Bischoff
case. See 4 Carmody, New York Practice 2618, footnote 54, for historical
sketch and collection of cases.
7'Levey v. Payne, (1922) 200 App. Div. 30, 192 N. Y. S. 346; Poland
v. United Traction Co., 88 App. Div. 281, 85 N. Y. S. 1, aff'd. on opinion
below, (1903) 177 N. Y. 557, 69 N. E. 1129; See 4 Carmody, New York
Practice 2617-2618.
12Failure to object is a waiver. Civil Practice Act. sec. 186.
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may not on its own motion change the place of trial." But if the
plaintiff brings the action in a county in which none of the parties
reside, the defendant has an absolute right, upon following the
proper procedure, to a change of the place of trial to the proper
county.74 Where the plaintiff brings the action in a county where
neither party resides, he wil not be permitted to change it to the
county where he resides upon the defendant's motion to change the
venue to the county of the defendant's residence." If the plain-
tiff, in an action against nonresidents of the state, lays the venue
in a county other than that of his residence, the nonresidents may
take advantage of the statute and demand a change of venue to
the county of plaintiff's residence.7 6 Where the action is brought
73Phillips v. Teitjen, (1905) 108 App. Div. 9, 95 N. Y. S. 469; Schober
v. Fifth Avenue Coach Co., (1905) 110 App. Div. 921, 96 N. Y. S. 1145.
"The supreme court is a court of general jurisdiction, extending over the
whole state. In transitory actions parties have a right to lay the venue
in any county and there have the issues disposed of, if they so desire. The
privilege of removal, which is given to the defendant, may be xwaived,
and if so waived the court of its own motion may not refuse to try the
action." Anderson v. Nassau Electric Ry. (1910) 138 App. Div. 816,
123 N. Y. S. 384, at p. 385.
74Finch School v. Finch, (1911) 144 App. Div. 687, 129 N. Y. S. 1;
Levey v. Payne, (1922) 200 App. Div. 30, 192 N. Y. S. 346; Shepard
v. Squire, (1894) 76 Hun 598, 28 N. Y. S. 218; Ferrin v. Huxley, (1904)
94 App. Div. 211, 87 N. Y. S. 1005; Lageza v. Chelsea Fibre Mills, (1909)
135 App. Div. 731, 119 N. Y. S. 906. The "proper procedure" involves
a demand by defendant, and consent by plaintiff within five days after
service of demand; or if no consent within the time, then motion within
fifteen days after service of demand and ten days after expiration of time
for plaintiff to consent. See Civil Practice Act, sec. 186; Rules of Civil
Practice, 145, 146 and 147.
75In Loretz v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., (1898) 34 App. Div. 1, 53 N.
Y. S. 1059, at p. 1059, it is said: "At the outset, the plaintiff had his
choice as between the two proper counties in which to bring his action.
These were Kings county, where he resided, and New York county, of
which the defendant corporation was constructively a resident. The
plaintiff chose to lay the venue in Queens county, where it did not belong.
The defendant then exercised the statutory right of demanding and
moving that the place of trial be changed to New York, as the proper
county. The plaintiff should not be allowed to defeat this application by
now consenting to try the case in the county where he lives. He elected
not to try it there when he designated Queens county as the place of trial,
and he should be held bound by that election, after the defendant has
taken steps to have the venue changed to one of the two proper counties
prescribed by the statute." Ferrin v. Huxley, (1904) 94 App. Div. 211, 87
N. Y. S. 1005.
75In Shepard v. Squire, (1894) 76 Hun 598, 28 N. Y. S. 218, at p.
219, it is said: "The defendants were at the time of the commencement
of the action, and are, residents of the state of Washington. The subject
of the action is land situated in that state. The plaintiff King is, and
has for several years been a resident of the state of Minnesota. The
place of residence of the other plaintiffs is Ilion, in the county of Herkimer,
N. Y. This action comes within those to which is applicable the statute
which provides that an action 'must be tried in the county in which one
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in the "wrong county" against several parties defendant, one de-
fendant alone may move for a change of venue, even against the
opposition of a co-defendant.7 7
In considering the practice in Nebraska, Ohio and Iowa, it was
discovered that considerable difficulty might arise in the joinder
of several parties defendant, each residing in different counties.
In all three states it is settled that the plaintiff may not, by the
means of joining a purely nominal party as a local defendant,
compel the out-of-county defendant to defend away from his home.
In order to secure this principle, Ohio and Nebraska permit the
out-of-county defendant to raise the question in his answer, try
the case on the merits, and if the plaintiff fails to recover a judg-
ment against the resident defendant, the objections to the juris-
diction of the court originally raised in the answer of the non-
resident are sustained. The result is that the plaintiff must con-
mence a new action. In Iowa, although the district court is a
court of state-wide jurisdiction, this principle is realized by giving
the out-of-county defendant the option to require a dismissal. If
the action is dismissed after one fair trial on the merits, the plain-
tiff must start all over again in the proper county. Again, the
defendant may require two trials on the merits.
In New York, the action may be brought "in the county in
which one of the parties resided at the commencement of the
action. '" What about this matter of joinder of purely nominal
defendants that has caused so much trouble and litigation in the
three other states considered-particularly in Nebraska and Ohio?
In New York, this problem is settled prior to a trial on the merits.
of the parties resided at the time of the commencement thereof.' Code
Civ. Pro. sec. 984. And because none of the parties resided in
the county of Monroe, and two of the plaintiffs then resided in the
county of Herkimer, the demand for the change to the latter, as the
proper county, was made. The defendants' attorney, not being served with
written consent thereto, gave, within due time, notice of motion, founded
upon his third demand, for change of the place of trial. The fact that
the defendants were non-residents of the state does not deny to them the
benefit of the statute referred to, for the purpose of proceeding in the
manner so provided for changing the place of trial to the proper county.
Nor are the words 'one of the parties,' in section 984, entitled to such
construction as to necessarily embrace all the plaintiffs or all the de-
fendants, when they, respectively, consist of more than one person. In that
case each one of the persons is a party plaintiff or defendant, and the
import of the language used is, in view of its purpose, the same as if it
read that 'an action must be tried in the county in which one of the
persons who is a party resided.'
77North Shore Industrial Co. v. Randall, (1905) 108 App. Div. 232, 95
N. Y. S. 758.
7SCivil Practice Act, sec. 182.
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If it is shown that the venue has been laid in some remote corner
of the state where one of the parties resides, but it is highly in-
convenient for all the other parties and their witnesses to try the
case at that place, a change of venue may be granted even to a
county in which none of the parties reside for "convenience of
witnesses.'",9 The convenience of expert witnesses usually will
not be considered, because it is presumed that they will receive
compensation for their services."s The same is true with regard
to witnesses who are the party's employees.8 " The place of trial
is not ordinarily changed from a rural to a metropolitan county,
"the convenience of witnesses is ordinarily best subserved by a
trial in the rural county, even though they are residing in the city
in which the trial is sought to be had, for the condition of the
calendar is just as important to a witness as the accessibility of
the court house."
8 2
The county in which the cause of action arose, in many cases is
the most convenient place of trial, even though none of the parties
reside there.83
It is beyond the scope of this paper to treat in detail the ap-
plication of the statute permitting change of place of trial for the
convenience of witnesses, but suffice it to say that this may be a
practicable and sensible method of meeting the objections to
joinder of nominal defendants which have caused so much un-
necessary difficulty in Nebraska and Ohio, and to some extent,
in Iowa. This is a means by which the proper venue may be de-
termined before trial; and the parties may have one, and only
one fair trial on the merits.
V. MINNESOTA
In transitory actions the district court of Minnesota is a court
of state-wide jurisdiction. 4 The venue of the ordinary personal
79Civil Practice Act, sec. 187.8OSolberg v. Ft. Orange Const. Co., (Sup. Ct. Spe. Term 1913) 142
N. Y. S. 228.
81Sparks v. United Traction Co., (1901) 66 App. Div. 204, 73 N. Y. S.
108.
824 Carmody, New York Practice 2627, and cases there collected.83Solberg v. Ft. Orange Const. Co., (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1913) 142
N. Y. S. 288; See 4 Carmody, New York Practice 2628.S4Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 9206: "Except as provided in sec-
tion 9207, every civil action shall be tried in the county in which it was
begun, unless the place of trial be changed as hereinafter prescribed; and,
when so changed, all subsequent papers in the action shall be entitled and
filed in the county to which such transfer has been made." Sec. 9214:
"All actions not enumerated in paragraphs 9207-9213 shall be tried in a
county in which one or more of the defendants reside when the action was
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action is laid in the county in which "one or more of the de-
fendants reside when the action was begun," and except as to
actions purely local in character, "every civil action shall be tried
in the county in which it was begun, unless the place of trial be
changed" as provided by statute.
The venue is specifically fixed by statute for certain classes of
actions.M
"Actions for the recovery of real estate, the foreclosure of a
mortgage or other lien thereon, the partition thereof, the de-
termination in any form of an estate or interest therein, and for
injuries to lands within this state, shall be tried in the county
where such real estate or some part thereof is situated, subject
to the power of the court to change the place of trial in the cases
specified in section 9216 subds. 1, 3, 4. If the county designated
in the complaint is not the proper county, the court therein shall
have no jurisdiction of the action." 8
This provision purports to limit the power of the court; it defines
the jurisdiction. As in Iowa, and unlike New York, the statute
purports to define the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-
matter of the action. But the effect of the statute has been largely
whittled away by judicial construction; the classification of local
begun. If none of the parties shall reside or be found in the state, or the
defendant be a foreign corporation, the action may be begun and tried
in any county which the plaintiff shall designate. A domestic corporation
other than railroad companies, street railway companies, and street rail-
road companies whether the motive power is steam, electricity, or other
power used by said corporations or companies, also telephone companies,
telegraph companies and all other public service corporations, shall be
considered as residing in any county wherein it has an office, resident agent
or business place. The above enumerated public service corporations shall
be considered as residing in any county wherein the cause of action shall
arise and wherein any part of its lines of railway, railroad, street railway,
street railroad, without regard to the motive power of said railroad, street
railway or street railroad; telegraph or telephone lines or any other public
service corporation shall extend, without regard to whether said corporation
or company has an office, agent or business place in said county, or not."
-
8Actions for official misconduct, and to recover penalties or forfeitures
imposed by statute, are to be tried in the county in which the cause of action
arose: Mason's Minnesota Statutes, sec. 9208. Actions and proceedings
prosecuted upon forfeited bail bonds or recognizances shall be heard and
tried in the county in which the forfeiture was adjudged: sec. 9209. Actions
upon cost bonds shall be tried in the county where such bond or security is
filed; an action against a non-resident defendant proceeded against by
attachment may be brought in any county wherein such defendant has
property liable to attachment: sec. 9210. Actions of replevin may be tried
in the county where the taking occurred, or where the plaintiff resides, or
in the county in which the property is situated: sec. 9211. Civil actions
for trespass in which the state is plaintiff may be begun and tried in such
county as the attorney general or other attorney authorized to bring the
same, shall select: sec. 9212.
86Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9207.
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actions has been narrowed by holding causes transitory wherever
possible.8 7
"It is settled . . . that the requirement that actions shall be
tried where the defendant resides is the general rule, and that the
requirement that certain actions shall be tried where the subject-
matter is situated is an exception to that rule, and that to bring a
case within the exception the subject-matter must be wholly
local.""8
There is nothing inherently impossible in the conclusion that
a state court of first instance may try the title to real estate wher-
ever situated in the state. "" Even under the above statute, when
the action is admittedly local, the venue may be changed to a
county other than that in which the real estate is situated, upon a
proper showing.90  Is it correct to say: "If the county designated
in the complaint is not the proper county, the court therein shall
have no jurisdiction of the action?"9' Logically, a distinction
should be made between lack of jurisdiction, and a statutory rule
or judge-made admonition not, under certain circumstances, to
exercise jurisdiction. Too often have courts hidden behind an
assumption of lack of power, to justify a decision not to exercise
that power which they have.92
67State v. District Court of Swift County, (1925) 164 Minn. 433, 205
N. W. 284, noted in (1926) 10 MiNNE-sorA LAW REviEw 608; see also in-
structive note in (1927) 11 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEw 260.
s8 State v. District Court of Swift County, (1925) 164 Minn. 433, 205
N. W. 284, 285. Taylor, C., enters upon an extended review of the cases
in which the actions have been held to be transitory, and concludes: "The
prior decisions may not be entirely consistent in all respects, yet they estab-
lish these general rules: That, where the subject-matter of an action is
land only, and the primary and principal relief sought relates to the land,
the action is local and must be tried where the land is situated; that, where
the subject-matter is a contract, and the primary and principal relief sought
is to enforce it, or to determine the rights and obligations growing out of
it, or to have it annulled as invalid, the action is transitory, and must be
tried where the defendant resides, although it may also involve the deter-
mination of rights in or title to real estate." See also: (1926) 10 MzN-
NESOTA LAw REVIEW 608; (1927) 11 MIINNESOTA LAW REviEw 260; State
ex rel. Child v. District Court, (1902) 85 Minn. 283, 88 N. W. 755; State
ex rel. Barrett v. District Court, (1905) 94 Minn. 370, 102 N.W. 869.
s9See discussion as to New York rule in part IV of text.
9°Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9207; sec. 9216.
9'Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9207 (italics mine).92This thought is expressed well in (1927) 11 MINNESOrA LAw REvIEw
260, at p. 270: "Jurisdiction should be carefully distinguished from the
propriety of its exercise. At bottom, the rule which confines the place of
trial of local actions to the forum of the locality where the land lies does not,
and logically cannot, limit the jurisdiction of the courts, the numerous ex-
pressions in the cases to the contrary notwithstanding. What the rule of
venue really does is to teach the courts self-restraint in the exercise of their
powers, and rather than admit a discretionary self-renunciation, the courts
would conceal their reluctance to act in given cases behind the cloak of
judicial incapacity."
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There may, therefore, be two distinct classes of venue statutes:
(1) those which direct that a certain class of actions shall be tried
in certain counties; but if the particular action is not brought in
the county specified, the court may proceed and render a valid
judgment; (2) those which provide that a certain class of actions
are local, and the court of some locality other than the one specified
should not exercise jurisdiction; and such rules are usually
framed in terms of lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction is
lack of power to decide; lack of power to decide is not a de-
termination not to exercise the power to decide. Justice Mitchell,
in a courageous dictum, expressed this idea, when he said with
reference to the statutory provision quoted above, that it
"is not to be construed as meaning that the court has no jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter of the action, in the full sense in which
that term is ordinarily used. The district court of the state, which
in a proper sense is one court, has jurisdiction of actions for the
recovery of real property. We have no doubt that, notwithstand-
ing the statute, the district court for any county in the state -would,
with the express consent of both parties, have jurisdiction to try
any action for the recovery of real property, although no part of
the property was situated in that county, which would not be the
fact if the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, in the
ordinary meaning of that term."93
This dictum seems to state the law in Minnesota. The district
court is really one court sitting in and for the respective counties.
In State v. District Court of Ramsey County9" the plaintiff brought
suit in Hennepin county to cancel a mortgage on real estate
located in Hennepin county. The defendant resided in Ramsey
county and procured a change of venue to that county, where the
case was tried and resulted in a judgment for defendant. Upon
appeal, the case was reversed and a new trial granted. Plaintiff
then applied to the Ramsey county court for an order remanding
the case to Hennepin county, on the ground that it was a local
action triable only in that county. The court denied the applica-
tion. The supreme court stated that the action was a local action
within the meaning of the statute, but
"by apparently acquiescing in the transfer to Ramsey county and
trying the case in that county without objection, plaintiff must be
deemed to have waived the right to insist upon a trial in I-lennepin
county, and to have acceded to the demand that the trial be in
Ramsey county.""5
93Smith v. Barr. (1899) 76 Minn. 513, 79 N. W. 507, 508; see also
(1927) 11 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 260.
94(1926) 168 Minn. 519, 210 N. W. 405.
96State v. District Court of Ramsey County, (1926) 168 Minn. 519,
210 N. W. 405, 406.
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If the statute really deprived the district court for Ramsey county
of the power to decide this case, no passive acquiescence of the
plaintiff could confer upon the court jurisdiction of the subject-
matter. In most cases it is unnecessary to make the distinction
between lack of jurisdiction and the determination not to exercise
jurisdiction; the result is the same under either theory. But in
some instances, the distinction should be realized, as in the illus-
tration above, and as in the problem of the power to try an action
for damages arising out of the trespass to foreign realty.98
The ordinary transitory action should be tried in the county
in which one or more of the defendants reside when the action
was begun, and if begun in the wrong county, that fact alone
does not deprive the court of the power to determine the con-
troversy; in fact, there is the statutory admonition not to refuse
to exercise the jurisdiction which is acquired 7  If the action is
brought against a single defendant in a "wrong county," he may
demand a change of venue to the proper county as a matter of
right.9"
"If there are several defendants residing in different counties, the
trial shall be had in the county in which a majority of them unite
in demanding, or, if the numbers be equal, in that whose county
seat is nearest."9 9
This provision has been construed to mean that where a majority
of the defendants demand a change of venue, and are equally
divided as to the county to which they desire the venue changed,
the difficulty will be solved by selecting the county whose count),
seat is nearest to the county in which the action was commenced;
but the statute has no application where less than a majority unite
in the demand for a change.100 The demand of the majority
removes the cause to the county agreed upon; no order is neces-
98This distinction, it is submitted, lies at the basis of the difference
between Cardozo, J. and Seabury, J., in Jacobus v. Colgate, (1916) 217
N. Y. 235, 111 N. E. 837; for an illuminating discussion of this problem,
see (1927) 11 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 260; see also (1920) 5 .asomox
LAw RmEzw 63; (1922) 6 MINNESOTA LAW REiEw 516.97See footnote 86, where sections 9206 and 9214 are set out. The
provision that a foreign corporation, though it has complied with the pro-
visions of law as to its right to do business in the state, may be sued in any
county which the plaintiff may designate, was held unconstitutional as vio-
lating the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the fed-
eral constitution. State v. District Court of Otter Tail County, (1929) 178
Minn. 72, 225 N. W. 915, noted in (1929) 14 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 83.
See also, (1929) 13 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 522.98Mason's 1927 finn. Stat., sec. 9215.
99Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9215.
looScott v. filler Liquor Co., (1913) 122 Minn. 377, 142 N. W. 817.
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sary.10  In determining whether a majority of the defendants
have demanded a change, a nonresident defendant will not be
counted." 2 However, a defendant may unite in a demand for a
change of venue before he has been summoned. 03 Where there
are several defendants residing in different counties, a majority
of such defendants may secure the change of venue authorized
by the statute by making proper affidavit and serving a joint
demand therefor, before the time for answering has expired as
to any of them, or by each of them making such affidavit and serv-
ing a demand for the same change at any time before his time
for answering expires.10' Even though the action is originally
brought in a county in which one of the defendants resides, if a
majority of the defendants unite in a demand for a change the
change must be made.10 5
"The venue of any civil action may be changed by order of
the court in the following cases: (1) Upon written consent of
the parties; (2) When it is made to appear, on motion, that any
party has been made a defendant for the purpose of preventing a
change of venue under section 9215; (3) When an impartial trial
cannot be had in the county wherein the action is pending; or
(4) When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice
would be promoted by the change."'' 6
The second ground stated above prevents the joinder of mere
nominal defendants as a means for the plaintiff to dictate the
venue. If the venue is laid in the county of the residence of a
nominal defendant, the venue might be changed if a majority of
the defendants unite in the demand. If a majority cannot unite in
the demand, it may be shown on motion for change of venue that
the resident is a mere nominal defendant. 07 Or, of course, as in
New York, the venue may be changed on the grounds that the
"convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted
by the change."' 0'
'
0
'Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9215; State v. District Court of
Ramsey County, (1934) 192 Minn. 541, 257 N. W. 277; State v. District
Court of Ramsey County, (1922) 152 Minn. 540, 188 N. W. 161.
10 2State v. District Court of Ramsey County, (1922) 152 Minn. 540,
188 N. W. 161.
0 3 See footnote 102.
'
04Grimes v. Ericson, (1904) 92 Minn. 164, 99 N. W. 621.
105Chadbourne v. Reed. (1901) 83 Minn. 447, 86 N. W. 415; see
also Collins v. Bowen, (1891) 45 Minn. 186, 47 N. W. 719.
106Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9216.
'
07The court apparently is influenced in its decision of such a motion
by the cause of action stated in the petition: W. B. Foshay Co. v. Mer-
cantile Trust Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 442, 208 N. W. 203; see also Roesher
v. Union Hay Co., (1915) 131 Minn. 489, 154 N. W. 789; Singer v. Singer,
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It is possible therefore, to determine the place of trial before
a trial on the merits. The trial court should be granted a wide
discretion in its rulings on motions for change of venue. The
place where the action should be tried is a matter which may be
settled before the trial, and one fair trial on the merits is all
any litigant should have the power to demand. 0 9 And in the face
of a rather specific statutory requirement, Minnesota has reached
this desirable result as to actions in rem, as well as in personam.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the county in which the trial is to take
place is a matter that should be definitely settled before a trial on
the merits. A procedure which permits the parties more than
one fair trial on the merits in order to determine a question which
might be determined before trial results in a sacrifice of time,
money and ordinary intelligence upon a worm-eaten altar of
formality. County lifies within a state are no more than con-
venient political lines for convenient diversification of govern-
mental functions. To hold that the state court of first instance is
limited in its jurisdiction to those lines in purely personal ac-
tions, or actions in rem is hardly a recognition of those lines on
any basis of convenience. 1' 0 It has even been suggested that state
lines today are no more than convenient political lines, and in all
(1927) 173 Minn. 57, 214 N. W. 778, opinion adhered to on rehearing, 173
Minn. 94, 216 N. W. 789.
lOSFauler v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., (1934) 191 Minn. 637, 253
N. W. 884.
109In Delasca v. Grimes, (1919) 144 Minn. 67, 174 N. W. 523, 524-525,
Lees, C. said: "The practice of obtaining a review of an order relating to
the venue of an action by appealing from an order denying a new trial, or
from a judgment, is not to be commended. A speedy determination of the
action upon the merits will not be reached if the question is reserved until
after the case has been tried, for, if a reversal be had on that ground, the
parties have been put to the expense of a trial on the merits, which has
accomplished nothing." In State v. District Court, (1921) 150 Minn.
498, 185 N. V. 1019, it was said, at p. 1020: "It was early held that the
aggrieved party could not appeal from an order denying or granting a
motion to change the place of trial, but that such order could be reviewed
upon appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial or from thejudgment.. . . The inadequacy of such relief is apparent. The desirability
of a speedy and final determination of the proper place of trial, before trial,
was commented on in Delasca v. Grimes, (1919) 144 Minn. 67, 174 N. W.
523, where the cases are reviewed. A practice which does not permit a
final determination of the proper place of trial, except on appeal, when, if
there has been error in determining it, the whole trial, no matter if rightly
conducted, goes for naught, is intolerable."
"10 See Pound, Organization of Courts, 6 Am. Jud. Soc. Bulletin.
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cases the place of trial should be tested by a rule of convenience."'
It is submitted that in all actions between residents of the
state, the problem of where the case should be tried is one that
should be settled before a trial on the merits; and the question
should be determined primarily on the basis of convenience to
the parties and witnesses with a view toward a speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Some definite rules are necessary to
determine the proper county in the vast majority of cases. The
county where the res is located is the usual venue provision for
local actions. In transitory actions New York says the residence
of any of the parties; Iowa says the residence of one of the
parties defendant; Minnesota says the county in which one or
more of the defendants reside when the action was begun. The
New York rule gives the plaintiff a wider selection. But granted
that there is some reasonable rule prescribing where such actions
should be brought; then, it is submitted, there should be some
means for the defendant to raise the question of convenience, and
he should be able to demand a change of venue if he can show that
the rule (which might designate the most convenient place of
trial in the vast majority of cases, and should be framed for that
purpose) does designate a very inconvenient place of trial in his
particular case. In other words, it would seem advisable to adopt
a rule which would designate the most convenient place for the
trial in the majority of cases; but as the ultimate test should be
convenience and efficiency in the workings of the judicial ma-
chinery, certain rules and standards might well be worked out
as means to that end, so that the place of trial might be changed
if the rule of thumb adopted for the mass of cases does not work
well in the particular case. It would seem also that this reason-
ing is applicable to all actions, in rem or in personam, where the
place of trial is the problem to be solved. Of course, this can
be done only when the trial court is a court of state-wide juris-
diction. 
-12
l'Roger S. Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate
Methods of Adjustment, (1930) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 41; See also Foster,
Place of Trial in Civil Actions, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217.
l12 Sedgwick, J., in Mosher v. Huwaldt, (1910) 86 Neb. 686, 688, 126
N. W. 143, recognized one of the difficulties of the Nebraska principle that
the district court is limited in its jurisdiction to the county in which it
sits, when he said: "The defendant may still be sued in a county distant
from his home. Perhaps a more just practice is furnished by providing
for the place of trial instead of limiting the place of beginning the action, as
in New York and other states. The matter is, of course, peculiarly within
the discretion of the legislature, and the province of the courts is to as-
certain the meaning of the legislature."
